Andrew Thorpe, University of Exeter, UK Studies of the entente cordiale tend to focus on various aspects of Anglo-French inter-state relations. This is entirely right and proper: the entente was, after all, an agreement between two states. It is to be expected that any volume covering the entente historically will focus primarily, as this one does, upon relations between governments, statesmen, diplomats and soldiers. Nonetheless, these are not the sum total of the contacts between the two countries. In particular, many people in both countries considered themselves to be a part of a wider international movement of revolutionaries who were working together to overthrow capitalism and imperialism and build a 'better' world. was the prelude to a significant upsurge in British radicalism, and for a time France was the
This was in part because they tended to be influenced by the view that the war had been caused in large part by the division of Europe into armed camps. In a sense, this was ironic, since it was essentially a liberal interpretation of the war's causes, which went on to have a significant influence in the creation of the League of Nations, upon which the British far left was to heap considerable abuse. However, it was possible to square such a view with a more Marxist interpretation that argued that the war had been caused by the development of rival imperialisms, since the bloc-formation that was described by the liberal view could be seen as an essential by-product of the imperialist tendencies of Europe's states. Indeed, this overlap between liberal and Marxist analyses would prove long-lived, and would enable the CPGB to profit for large parts of its history from what were essentially liberal positions. However, where they came into conflict -as in 1939 -the party would face problems.
The other notion that came out of the war was the idea that the French left was fatally compromised. As John Horne has shown, the French left had faced an unenviable dilemma as war with Germany had erupted, and ultimately the great majority of it settled for the 'choice of 1914'. This was not simply a relapse into some visceral form of super-patriotism. Instead, it was calculated that, since war had come anyway, the labour movement would be better able to maintain its identity, and defend its interests, as part of a national war effort, rather than by trying to stand outside it. This was, in many ways, a sound calculation. However, it 'rendered 5 official labour leaderships vulnerable to those who rejected the "choice of 1914" or who urged the full use of labour's power to protect its interests'. 6 In other words, the choice to support the war effort predetermined that there would be hostility from an anti-war minority.
For British far leftists, the French Socialists had shown themselves no better than the Labour party leadership. On the other hand, the breakaway of the independent Social Democrats (the USPD) and the revolutionary Spartakists seemed to suggest that there was still a strong strain of socialist internationalism and revolutionary zeal in Germany. Meanwhile, the Russian One of the first acts of the Comintern was to help in the formation of Communist parties in both Britain and France in 1920. The creation of the CPGB in August 1920 was the 6 culmination of a long series of discussions between various far-left organisations. In the end, the new party amounted, at least initially, to little more than an aggrandised BSP. The rapidlyexpanding Labour party was able to marginalize the new body with a degree of ease:
Communist attempts to affiliate to the larger body were rebuffed, and steps were taken to ensure that Communists could not become candidates for, or members of, the party. At first, prospects in France looked brighter. The French Communist party (PCF) was formed in
December 1920, when, at the Tours conference of the French Socialist party, the SFIO, a majority of the latter body voted to re-form as a Communist party affiliated to the Comintern. The minority, however, then re-formed the SFIO, and in the years that followed the latter rapidly outstripped the PCF in strength and prestige.
From the outset, it was obvious that there was potential for the CPGB and the PCF to collaborate. After all, their respective states were doing so in the aftermath of the war, and would continue to do so, although on a less close basis, for most of the inter-war period.
Specific issues, in short, drew the two parties together. Britain and France remained the two most important states in the League of Nations, from which the Soviet Union was excluded, and which was seen as a thieves' kitchen. 8 Secondly, the entente powers remained the world's leading imperialist powers -indeed, the League's mandates system had, in effect, added to their imperial possessions. This meant that there was much potential for greater collaboration on anti-colonial agitation, which was a particular enthusiasm of the Comintern. Portugal. 21 In theory, the Comintern was a smooth and well-oiled machine; in practice, this bureaucratic division made it increasingly difficult to co-ordinate the efforts of the CPGB and being driven forward 'with hurricane speed' -proved illusory. 26 The fact that the economic experience of the two countries varied at this point, with the downturn in France coming somewhat later than in Britain, also inhibited close collaboration. 27 Furthermore, the two parties were both struggling to hold onto their existing members, let alone expanding, at least in the early years of 'class against class'. In this context, it was often a case of the parties doing what they could to remain in being, rather than moving into such exotic directions as the intensification of Anglo-French links.
In any case, Communist eyes were increasingly focussed on Germany in this period. The 
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Soviet reactions to the rise of Hitler were mixed: so too were the reactions of the Communist parties around the world. It was possible, in theory, to take up any one of three positions. The first was that Hitler and the Nazis would prove to be short-lived phenomena, the last and most brutal gasp of a dying capitalist system. Communist parties should redouble their efforts along class against class lines, refusing to compromise, especially with the social democrats who would try to resist supposedly growing revolutionary impulses. 28 Secondly, it could be argued that although Hitler was not a flash in the pan, he was predominantly an anti-western politician, whose main target was Versailles and the Anglo-French alliance that had created it;
that, while he was domestically anti-Communist, he was a foreign policy realist and would revert to a traditional alignment with Russia, continuing with the kind of policy that had been concluded by Weimar Germany in the 1922 treaty of Rapallo. If this view was correct, then the Soviets could welcome his accession to power, and the task would be to persuade
Communist parties abroad to keep their fire fixed on the British and French governments.
Finally, it was possible to argue that Hitler posed a serious threat to communism, not just in Germany, but everywhere, especially the USSR; and that therefore the best tactic was to resist him and Nazi Germany to the full. This would involve Communist parties in Britain and
France agitating for full-scale military alliances between their countries and the Soviet Union, to counter any danger of German attack.
In 1933, all three of these views found influential supporters at the highest levels of The experiences of the two parties began to move still further apart after the seventh world congress. At the November 1935 general election, the British party -largely in pursuit of better relations with the Labour party, but also in recognition of its own miserable prospectswithdrew all but two of its candidates. When one of these -William Gallacher at West Fifewas elected to parliament, the virtual euphoria of Pollitt and his colleagues must have seemed odd to the French party, which had long had a bloc of deputies in the French Chamber. For its part, the PCF, was about to enter its annus mirabilis. It entered the elections as part of a popular front, which went on to win the elections. A popular front government was formed under the Socialist, Leon Blum. Although the Communists decided, for various reasons, against taking ministerial office in the government, they were, for a time, of central importance to it. Indeed, it was largely through Communist intervention that the strike wave that followed the elections was ended amicably with the Matignon agreement, which enshrined in law a series of important rights for workers, such as paid holidays. Electoral success and practical influence on government policy in the interests of the workers was not quite the revolutionary transformation for which the PCF still claimed to be working, but it was a long way ahead of anything that their British counterparts could achieve at the time. And yet, at the same time, there were things that continued to bind the two parties together.
At the bureaucratic level, the seventh world congress had abolished the old with Britain, the chief proponent of 'non-intervention', by which they both did their utmost to avoid being drawn into the conflict, and still more into a general European war. This meant that they maintained, against increasing evidence, that the policy was, in effect, working, when in fact German, Italian and Soviet forces were all involved in one way or another.
Naturally, British Communists were quick to attack what they saw as the duplicitous behaviour of the British and French governments which, they believed, were effectively encouraging fascism. In addition, of course, the foreign volunteers who went to Spain were largely forced to travel though France and be organised to a large extent by French
Communists, which meant that there were closer personal contacts between significant numbers of British and French Communists than ever before. 41 As the prospects in Spain dimmed, however, the focus moved back to the direct threat posed by Nazi Germany. Both the CPGB and the PCF ran strong campaigns against the appeasement policy being favoured by the British government and its increasingly anti-left French counterpart. In one sense, they were well placed to lead the attack: two leading Communist parties could try to work together to change the common policy of their two governments. The logic became even more compelling when, in October 1938, the Munich agreement broke any last lingering links between the French government and the PCF. Péri. 45 But it soon became clear that he was in fact pushing the line favoured by Moscow; and eventually the party overturned its earlier opposition to conscription. As a result, on 20 May, Pollitt offered his resignation from the post of party secretary, although for the time being it was not accepted. 46 The next time he offered, it would be. Anglo-French relations, both interstate and inter-party, were beginning to have a significant impact on the CPGB and its leadership.
Meanwhile, the chances of the two parties achieving anything of immediate significance in The new line rejected the view that the war being fought to defend democracy against fascism. Instead, it was a conflict of rival imperialisms, whose outcome was a matter of indifference to the working class of all countries. There was nothing to choose, so far as the workers were concerned, between British and French imperialism on the one hand, and
German imperialism on the other. If anything -so the more extreme versions went -British and French attitudes had helped to promote German revanchism, and so Britain and France could be seen as even more culpable than Nazi Germany. At one level, of course, this was palpable nonsense, so much so that it has usually been seen as nothing more than the naïve swallowing of Soviet self-interest by gullible British (and French) Communists. As I have argued elsewhere, there can be no doubt that the Comintern's imprimatur was an important influence on many British Communists, not least those who were relatively new to the party and for whom a direct and explicit Comintern intervention was a novelty with which they had little idea how to deal other than to obey. In reality, though, the line of the British Communist party changed less in practice than it did in theory. The party did not launch a strong campaign of revolutionary defeatism, or anything of the sort. While it did continue to press the 'peace' line, it also kept its head down to a certain extent, focussing on day-to-day issues rather than that of the war. 54 Pollitt, after 'admitting' his 'error' with an insincerity that was recognised on all sides, soon returned to the higher levels of the party, although it as not until 1941 that he returned to the leadership.
Even so, the fall of France in June 1940 did lead to a significant, if short-lived, change in the Communists' approach to the war. Suddenly, a new, defencist line began to be put forward.
Ivor Montagu's book, The Traitor Class, was a best seller: Montagu, a Communist who was personally and politically close to Pollitt, argued that the fall of France was due to the treachery of its ruling class, and that the same could happen in Britain. 55 It was argued that 'Two Hundred Families' had dominated French society, economy and politics, and had 21 effectively betrayed France to the Germans. Strong parallels were claimed with British society on the basis of earlier Left Book Club publications alleging close connections between the supporters of Appeasement and big business. 56 The implication was obvious -that there was after all something to choose between German imperialism on the one hand and French (and indeed British) imperialism on the other. The Daily Worker referred to the defeat of France as 'this sad hour' -hardly in line with the view that there was nothing to choose between French and German imperialism so far as the French working class was concerned. 57 Once again, therefore, France moved to the centre of the CPGB's discourse about the war.
However, the absence of Soviet approval for a more wholehearted change of line meant that there was, at this stage at least, no long-lived, overt return to Pollitt's earlier policy.
There remains much controversy about the PCF's performance in the period from the fall of
France to the German invasion of the USSR the following year, the time 'between the Junes'. 58 For the CPGB, 'between the Junes' of 1940 and 1941 was difficult in one sense, in it could not openly come out for gung-ho prosecution of the war effort; but, in another, it was quite profitable, as it took up issues like inadequate air raid shelters, pay, prices, rationing, and service dependents' allowances to make something of an impact, not least through the People's Convention in January 1941. However, the banning that month of their newspaper, the Daily Worker, was a sign that state repression was never far away. Thanks to Hitler, however, the party was on the verge of a new era of apparent success.
V
The new era began on Conversely, the reputation of the PCF flourished. The party's role in the Resistance has, of course, aroused much discussion and debate, but it was real and significant enough not only to offer short-term glory to the party, but also to help forge a collective mentality and memory that would keep the party firmly united for more than a generation. Nothing that the CPGB experienced during the war could rival this -the nearest was probably the fight against the ban on the Daily Worker, which hardly compared, for all that the party tried to make of it, at the time and afterwards. 63 Even the fact that the party's leader, Thorez 
